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PREFACE 
The Great Depression had a tremendous impact upon the structure of 
farm tenancy in Oklahoma as well as other agricultural areas of the 
country. When Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his advisers created the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration to aid farmers, its policies re-
sulted in displacement of tenants throughout the Cotton Belt. These 
early displacements, often popularly attributed to drought conditions, 
were more directly caused by the provisions of the Cotton Section of 
the AAA. Both the tenant provisions and the rental payment program 
greatly reduced the already tenuous position of cotton tenants in Okla-
homa and all areas where the share crop and crop lein systems prevailed. 
In the first year of the AAA its leaders were faced with the fact 
that crops were already planted and growing. Thus they had to pay 
farmers to plow under a percentage of the crop in order to reduce over-
production. Tenant farmers were actually aided in 1933, as they par-
ticipated directly in the program, and shared fully in the benefit 
payments. However, the following years were not as beneficial. The 
two-year plan presented to farmers by the Cotton Section of the AAA in 
1934 did not allow share tenants and sharecroppers to participate in 
the program. These tenants, who comprised the majority of cotton tenant 
farmers, could participate only through their landlord. When landlords 
were forced to make a choice between sharing benefit payments with these 
tenants or renting the land to the government, they chose the latter 
iii 
option in most cases and used hired farm labor to farm their holdings• 
Although AAA officials made some attempts to protect the rights of ten-
ants, their primary concern was to aid the large farmers with whom the 
success of the plan rested. Thus, the displacements began throughout 
the Cotton Belt due mainly to the policies of the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Administration. 
A number of people have assisted in the preparation of this manu-
script. Thanks are due to Dr. Norbert R. Mahnken for his guidance and 
suggestions throughout the preparation and writing, and to Doctors 
Richard C. Rohrs and John Paul Bischoff for their critical analysis and 
editing in final preparation. Finally, I wish to thank my parents for 
their support throughout my education. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The early history of Oklahoma was influenced by agricultural de-
velopments. Residents witnessed the evolution of an.agriculture that 
included the characteristics of both the Old South and the Great Plains, 
and thus this evolution included the rise and fall of Southern tenancy· 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The distinc-
tive role as a border community was characteristic of many phases of 
Oklahoma development. Geographers at various times have called Oklaho.m~· 
the most northern of Southern states, the most southern of Northern 
1 
states, a Southwestern state, and a border state. 
The problem of geographic categorization stems from the fact that 
parts of Oklahoma are as far north as southern Missouri, other parts are 
as far south as northern Texas, and still other portions are as far west. 
as eastern Colorado. Located as the state is between the Arkansas and 
Red rivers, two of the great western tributaries to the Mississippi 
River, the topography of Oklahoma bears great contrast. The line which 
divides the "treeless region" of the Great Plains from the Mississippi 
River region runs north and south through eastern Oklahoma from the 
Kansas border near Coffeyville to the Texas border near Sherman. This 
line separates the humid region of the river plain from the sub-humid 
2 
region which comprises most of the Great Plains. The major rivers and 
the numerous feeder streams which cross the state flow primarily from 
1 
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northwest to southeast forming a rich alluvial region through most of 
the state. 
The richness of this alluvial area makes the extensive valleys and 
plains of Oklahoma well-suited to the cultivation of many different 
crops. Today the primary cash crops are wheat and soybeans, yet from 
the early days of territorial Oklahoma through the New Deal era, the 
predominant cash crop was cotton. Cotton was grown as early as the 
1820s in eastern Oklahoma and spread throughout much of the area during 
the next century. 
Production of cotton began in the Cross Timbers region of eastern 
Oklahoma. This is an area of approximately six million acres which con-
tains sandstone, red-dish, and red clay beds mixed with dark bottom 
soils of the Arkansas and Red rivers. The area proved to be well-suited 
to cotton production because of its soil, an annual rainfall average of 
thirty-five to forty inches, and a long growing season of 200 to 230 
3 days. The soil groups of the southern and western production areas of 
Oklahoma include the Rolling Red Plains, Reddish Prairies, and the 
Granitic Mountains. In this region a long growing season of 230 to 
260 days, along with the appropriate soil, compensate for the sometimes 
deficient rainfall of 20 to 35 inches and combine to produce high cotton 
yields. 4 
Prevailing southerly winds and warm, sunny days dominate Oklahoma 
springs, summers, and falls, and provide the long growing season. Much 
of Oklahoma is in the area known as the Prairie Plains, which is an 
area of the treeless plain but is well-watered enough (more than 
twenty-five inches) to be excluded from sub-humid classification. This 
region has been called "the most profitable agricultural region in the 
United States."5 The winters are short but often extreme with sudden, 
heavy snowfalls and sub-zero temperatures usually followed by a surge 
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in temperature which promotes a rapid thaw. Contrasted with mild 
springs is the heat of the summer months, and the average annual temper-
ature range is near one hundred degrees. The extreme temperatures of 
winter and summer help provide the proper erosion and weathering to 
make the soil fertile. 
The first reported inhabitants of Oklahoma were a number of tribes 
collectively known as the plains Indians. Though many of these tribes 
probably passed through the area over the centuries, when Coronado ex-
plored Oklahoma during the sixteenth century, he reported contacts 
with only the Caddoan and Athapasacan divisions, which included many 
smaller tribes such as the Wichita and Apache. 6 These were basically 
non-agricultural people who left rio imprint on the volumes of agri-
cultural history. No new inhabitants came to Oklahoma until the nine-
teenth century, when the federal government under President Andrew 
Jackson forced removal of several tribes of eastern Indians from the 
more settled areas of the southeastern United States to the west. Be-
tween 1820 and 1880 governmental policy compelled over sixty American 
tribes to migrate from their natural environs to present-day Oklahoma. 7 
The greatest influx of Indians into Oklahoma was during the 1830s. These 
Indian tribes, the Cherokee, Choctaw, Creek, Chickasaw, and Seminole, 
known as the Five Civilized Tribes, came to eastern Oklahoma over the 
infamous Trail of Tears. 8 
Though they suffered tremendous hardships on that forced migra-
tion, many of the Indians survived the trek and began settling into 
their new territory by 1833. In Indian Territory the tribes began to 
apply the farming skills they had used in the southeastern United 
States for centuries. _Early in the nineteenth century the Choctaw 
learned to grow cotton in their Mississippi homeland. 9 They brought 
this skill into the Choctaw Nation of southeastern Indian Territory, 
and the first cotton crop was planted in the territory in 1825. 10 
Cotton farming was well~established in Indian Territory along the Red 
and Arkansas rivers by the 1840s. The richer Cherokees and Choctaws 
had plantations much like the ones in the Old South, which produced 
4 
considerable amounts of cotton during the ante-bellum years. One Cher-
okee plantation owner farmed over 500 acres and had nearly three hundred 
11 
slaves. The farmers used the steamboats which traveled up the Arkan-
d R d . k h . 12 sas an e r1vers to mar et t e1r cotton. 
The Civil War brought about great changes in Indian Territory as 
well as the rest of the nation. Just as the system of Black slavery and 
the plantation system were destroyed in the southeastern states, those 
systems were also destroyed in Indian Territory with the Confederate de-
feat. The Five Civilized Tribes were split on the question of loyalty 
to the Union or Confederacy, but those who owned sla'ves sided with the 
South. At the end of the war those tribes which had supported the Con-
federacy were forced to recognize the abolition of slavery. Emancipa-
tion resulted in an acute shortage of labor on plantations in the years 
following the war. As a result, cotton production was curtailed severe-
13 ly in those years. 
During the decades following the Civil War, a combination of fac-
tors led to a great influx of settlers into Indian Territory. First, 
the Indian Territory participated in the post-war railroad construction 
boom. The population of states surrounding the Indian Territory grew 
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dramatically during the late nineteenth century as did the desire for 
communication and transportation among these states. Thus, Indian Ter-
ritory became a crossroads for the construction of interstate railroad 
lines. The first of these major interstate lines was the Missouri, 
Kansas, Texas line which followed the Old Texas Road through the Chero-
kee, Creek, and Choctaw nations from Kansas to Texas. This line com-
pleted in 1872 was followed by another north-south truck line and an 
east-west line. The Atchison-Topeka and Santa Fe Company projected a 
connecting line from Wichita, Kansas, to Fort Worth, Texas, and secured 
the right to build this road through central Indian Territory in 1884. 
The original line was followed in 1887 by a third major truck line bi-
secting Indian Territory from east to west. This line, originally the 
Choctaw and Gulf Railroad, was later absorbed by the Rock Island Rail-
road. These and other short lines brought settlers to Indian Territory 
in the form of construction workers, repairmen, operators, and tele-
graphers. Further, the railroads brought northern and eastern culture 
h . 1 d . 14 to t e 1so ate terr1tory. 
A second factor contributing to the influx of people into Indian 
Territory was the long-haul cattle drives of the 1870s. These famous 
drives in which cowboys drove herds of longhorn cattle from their breed-
ing grounds in southern Texas to the railheads in Missouri and Kansas. 
From there the cattle were shipped by rail to the slaughter hourses of 
Chicago. The cattle drivers also used Indian Territory as a crossroads, 
driving the cattle in herds of two to three thousand up first the 
Shawnee Trail, and later up the Chisholm and Western trails. The long 
drives gave way to open range ranching in western and central Kansas by 
the mid-1870s, yet served to bring mo.re non-Indian traffic into the 
land. 15 
6 
The post-war years also brought the first tenant farmers to Indian 
Territory. While tribal laws prohibited members of the Five Civilized 
rribes from leasing their lands to outsiders, economic factors compelled 
many of the landowners to "employ" non-Indians to work their lands. 
This circumvention of the law allowed thousands of land-hungry people 
to migrate into eastern Indian Territory. By 1882, there were approxi-
mately 12,000 cotton tenants "employed" in Indian Territory. 16 
Due to the influx of settlers into Indian Territory, an acute 
interest developed in the surrounding states in opening some of the 
western and central areas during the 1870s and 1880s. In 1881, the 
"Boomer" movement began in southern Kansas. Organized by Captain David 
L. Payne, the members of the movement pushed for the settlement of un-
occupied sections of Indian Territory. With the well-organized actions 
of the Boomer movement, the cause gained sympathy in Congress in the 
mid-1880s. Pressure from supportive Congressmen such as Charles H. 
Mansur of Missouri and James Baird Weaver of Iowa resulted in the open-
ing of the Unassigned Lands in 1889. The Unassigned Lands were areas 
which the government had planned to use for future Indian resettlement, 
but in 1889 Congress passed the Springer Amendment to the Indian Appro-
priations Bill thereby opening nearly two million acres of Unassigned 
Lands on 22 April 1889. 17 
The decade following the Land Run of 1889 brought a great number 
of people into the newly formed Oklahoma Territory, as 431,000, mostly 
homesteaders from Kansas, Kansas, and Missouri, rushed into the new 
territory. Most of these homesteaders settled on 160 acre tracts and 
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farmed about twenty acres. They built sod or fragile frame houses, and 
plowed through the hard-packed earth of the prairie in hopes of plant-
ing and harvesting a bountiful corn or wheat crop. 18 Under the pro-
visions of the Homestead Act, these settl~rs became owners of their 
homesteads after five years of maintaining the farm. Thus northwestern 
and north central Oklahoma were not areas of exceptionally high tenancy 
around the turn of the century, while in the eastern half, which still 
remained Indian Territory, tenancy continued to increase. 
There were two primary reasons for the rapid increase in tenancy 
in Indian Territory. As mentioned earlier, the destruction of the 
plantation system removed the slave labor supply for work in the cotton 
fields, leaving Indian landlords with little choice but to circumvent 
tribal laws and to employ white and black workers to farm their lands. 
In reality, most of these employees were tenant farmers and share-
croppers. A second important factor in the increase in cotton tenancy 
was the westward movement of the Cotton Belt. Over the years, erosion, 
soil depletion, and depredations by the boll weevil had taken a toll on 
the production areas of the Old South. As this area began to yield 
less and less per acre, the mobile cotton farmers of the post-bellum 
South migrated to the Southwest in search of more productive land. This 
quest brought many southern farmers to Indian and Oklahoma Territory 
where too often the role of tenant farmer was the only one they could 
fill. 
From the 1880s through the mid-twentieth century, cotton produc~ 
tion increased in the southwestern part of the United States, with Texas 
and Oklahoma producing roughly fifty percent of the national total by 
1914. The Red River valley became one of the major producing areas in 
8 
the country, where farmers grew nearly two million bales of cotton by 
1899. Cotton farmers who migrated to this area were pleased to discover 
the soil would successfully grow both long and short staple cotton. 19 
In 1887, the government enacted the Dawes Act, which had important 
effects on tenancy in Oklahoma Territory. The act disposed of reserva-
tion lands other than the Five Civilized Tribes by dividing the land 
into individual holdings parcelled out to individual Indians. However, 
the act stipulated these lands could not be sold by the Indian to whom 
they were alloted for a period of twenty-five years. Indian allotees 
could nevertheless lease their holdings to tenant farmers, and this was 
the course many of the Indians followed. During the 1890s the Dawes 
Commission similarly broke the lands of the Five Civilized Tribes into 
individual holdings. Tenancy had grown in eastern Oklahoma during the 
days when tribal laws prohibited it, and now that the government had 
legalized the leasing of allotments, tenants poured into the territory 
during the last decade of the nineteenth century. By 1899, there were 
25,322 farms producing cotton in Indian Territory with white tenants 
working over 20,000 of them. 20 
The first decade of the twentieth century brought Indian and 
Oklahoma territories together as the state of Oklahoma. During the 
administration of Theodore Roosevelt, Congress approved the admission 
of Oklahoma into the Urtion, and on 7 November 1907, it became the 
f . h 21 
. orty-s1xt state. 
The first years of the state saw Oklahoma 1 s population grow to 
1.65 million. Many of the migrants were agricultural workers who in-
creased both the farm population and the tenancy rate. Of the 190,192 
farms in Oklahoma listed in the 1910 census, tenants operated 104,137, 
9 
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or 54.7 percent, of these farms. Oklahoma cotton production in-
creased accordingly, with the state's farmers producing over 550,000 
bales by 1909, ranking tenth in the nation. By 1914, cotton production 
had shifted from the dominance of the Old and New South to the South-
west, with Texas producing 4.5 million bales and Oklahoma moving to 
fifth in production with 1.26 million bales. High prices and strong 
demand encouraged farmers to produce at their maximum during the early 
1900s, as both foreign and domestic demand pushed cotton lint prices to 
13.4 cents per pound by 1910, more than double the prices which had 
prevailed during the depressed period of the 1890s. 23 
The tenancy rat€ grew significantly during the first decade of 
statehood due to the availability of rental lands. With the encourage-
ment of improving cotton prices, tenants continued to come to Oklahoma 
from the eastern cotton states where erosion and the boll weevil had re-
duced productivity sharply. This influx of tenant farmers resulted in 
a rise in the number of farmers operating under the share crop and crop 
lein systems. These systems under which the farmer either shared one-
half of his crop with the landlord or established a line of credit with 
a nearby business, the security being his growing crop, began in the 
Southwest with the destruction of the plantation system after the 
Civil War. Spreading throughout Oklahoma and Texas in the 1890s, the 
share crop and crop lein systems included nearly seventy-five percent 
24 
of the cotton workers by the 1900s. By nature, the share crop and 
crop lein systems often had a debilitating effect on those under it, 
and some landowners and country store owners derived great income at 
the tenants' expense from the leasing system. Traditionally of a lower 
class and a poorly educated person, the tenant farmer was often unaware 
10 
that his landlord or the store owner sometimes cheated him in one way 
or another. Cotton tenants, with their high mobility and low education-
al level, suffered most profoundly of all tenants under dishonest land-
lords and creditors, and this fact prevented their ever moving up the 
h . 1 . 1 1 1 dd h. 25 myt 1ca agr1cu tura a er to owners 1p. 
The beginning of the First World War brought mixed blessings to 
cotton farmers. Initially, the war had the impact of deflating cotton 
prices due to European countries enacting trade barriers against Ameri-
can goods. As a result of the dislocations of foreign trade, cotton 
prices dropped from 11.77 cents pe~ pound in 1914 to 6.85 cents in 1915. 
As the war raged on and German attacks on American shipping brought an 
end to neutrality, the United States government stepped up shipments 
• ! 
of American agricultural and industrial goods to ithe Allies. After 
American entry into the war, cotton demand increased even more, and by 
1919 prices soared to nearly thirty-five cents per pound. In the same 
year, Oklahoma production which had dropped during the early war years 
26 
again rose to 1.016 million bales. Yet expansion in cotton was not 
as great as wheat expansion during the war. It was the post-war years 
which were to see the great expansion of cotton culture in Oklahoma. 
The 1920s was a decade of prosperity and tremendous economic growth 
in urban America. The First World War was a catalyst which brought 
modernization to American industry, with a great increase in productive 
capabilities. This increase was met by an equally great increase in 
domestic demand for manufactured goods. Industrial wage earners found 
themselves in a better position financially than ever before as their 
buying power rose and allowed them to acquire many mass produced goods 
which were available during the decade. Unfortunately, much of this 
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increased buying power was made possible at the expense of the American 
farmers, who did not share at all in the prosperity of the 1920s~ 
While manufacturers in America enjoyed a decade of high prices and 
increasing demand, American farmers experienced a decade of slumping 
agricultural prices, and in many cases, declining demand. The Wilson 
administration encouraged production increases in most areas of agri-
culture to supply Allied needs. When European fields were returned to 
production by the early 1920s, much of the foreign demand which had 
driven prices to their peak levels in 1919 ended, but the stimulus of 
the war compelled farmers to continue expanding their production in 
spite of many warnings. 
The problem of possible overproduction had been recognized as early 
as the first decade of the century. Leaders of tfe cotton growing in-
dustry, such as R. V. Johnson, president of the Southern Cotton 
Growers' Association of Atlanta, realized one of the most serious areas 
of overproduction in cotton was territorial Oklahoma. At a meeting of 
the Territorial Cotton Association at Guthrie in 1905, Johnson urged 
territorial cotton growers to reduce their acreage by twenty-five per-
cent to avoid a potential oversupply. 27 Cotton growers paid little at-
tention to the pleas of men like Johnson and continued to expand both 
acreage and yields. 
The post-war era brought substantial price drops during two 
periods, 1920-1921, and after a brief revival, another era of decline 
from 1926 to 1932. United States cotton production reached eighteen 
million bales in 1926, and with this glut of marketable cotton, prices 
slumped to twelve cents per pound. Oklahoma cotton growers continued 
their steady expansion during the 1920s, with their output reaching 
12 
1.7 million bales by 1926, which placed Oklahoma third among cotton pro-
d . 26 uct1on states. Oklahoma cotton growers watched as this increased 
production resulted in lower prices throughout the 1920s in both lint 
and cotton ~eed. From a peak level in 1919 of 35.6 cents per pound for 
lint and 59.74 cents per pound for seed, prices plumetted to 19.3 and 
29.17 cents per pound, respectively, by 1925, and by 1930 those prices 
had fallen to 8.7 and 23.27 cents per pound. Average price indices for 
Oklahoma cotton revealed the economic position of farmers was far more 
serious than the price levels indicated. Using the average price levels 
of 1910 through 1914 as a base of 100, price indices for lint cotton 
dropped from 248 in 1920 to 105 by 1930. Clearly, there was a crisis 
developing in Oklahoma cotton producing, as well as in most areas of 
Am . . 1 d . h T . 29 er1can agr1cu ture ur1ng t e went1es. 
The nature of the agricultural crisis became the focus of much of 
the national political controversy during the 1920s. Farm leaders no 
longer satisfied with the Populist goals of cheap money and monopoly 
control, began to strive for a system of supports for agricultural 
prices. In 1921, George N. Peek, an administrator of the John Deere 
Corporation, concerned over dismal plow sales declared "healthy plow 
sales depend on healthy farmers." Peek and his colleague, Hugh Johnson, 
began working on a pl~n seeking equality for agriculture. Peek and 
Johnson believed that due to its weakened position in an industrial 
society, American agriculture was vulnerable to foreign competition 
and government favoritism toward manufacturers; and that price supports 
were necessary to bring farmers to an equal position with urban Ameri-
30 
cans. 
This concept of parity prices for agricultural products was the 
basis of the McNary-Haugen bills which produced such controversy in 
Congress during the 1920s. The first McNary-Haugen Bill was defeated 
in Congress in June of 1924. It called for subsidized marketing of 
13 
surplus farm goods on foreign markets to raise the domestic price, and 
a general price support for domestic products relative to the base 
price period of 1909-1914. 31 The bill had little chance of success 
during the early part of the prosperity decade when conservative Re-
publican power was at its height. To the believers of laissez-faire, 
a plan which called for price supports was contrary to basic American 
levels and went far beyond the constitutional powers of the federal 
government. Thus, the dominance of conservatives in Washington ensured 
defeat. 
In November of 1926, farm leaders representing many of the organ-
ized groups and associations of the country met in St. Louis, Missouri, 
to organize support for the plan. When all groups emerged from the 
meeting in support of the plan, the leaders returned to their organi~a-
tions to urge members to write congressmen in support of the plan. 
McNary-Haugenites placed enough pressure upon elected officials that the 
second McNary-Haugen Bill was introduced into Congress in 1927. This 
bill passed both the House and the Senate during February, but was 
vetoed by President Coolidge who declared the bill was unconstitution-
al.32 
A third McNary-Haugen Bill was presented to the 1928 session of the 
Congress, and again the bill passed both houses. After congressional 
passage, letters and telegrams flooded the executive office from around 
the country urging the president to sign the bill. Coolidge, however, 
ignoring these pleas, stood firm with another veto. 33 Although the 
14 
McNary-Haugen battle proved to be a failure, eventually it did force 
the following administration to enact some government marketing con-
trols and price supports for agriculture. The passage of the Agri-
cultural Marketing Act of 1929 was evidence of this. 
Enacted in June of 1929, the Agricultural Marketing Act was Presi-
dent Hoover's answer to the agricultural crisis. It established the 
Federal Farm Board which had the powet to set marketing quotas on cer-
tain crops, to enact cooperative techniques among farmers, and to fix 
prices if necessary. To perform these tasks the government allocated 
500 million dollars. 34 Unfortunately, the Farm Board failed to act in 
its full capacity during Hoover's administration. Still believing in 
·non-interference in the private sector, the leaders of the Farm Board 
sat idly while farmers suffered. Co~gress was aliSO reluctant to sup-
i 
port the Board. Various farm groups criticized the Farm Board for its 
lack of initiative in setting quotas and for its reluctance to fix 
prices, when the Great Depression brought American farming to its worst 
. . . h" 35 pos1t1on 1n 1story. 
The Great Depression devastated nearly all areas of the American 
economy, yet no part suffered more than agriculture. While agricul-
tural implement and motor vehicle prices fell only six and sixteen per-
cent, respectively, between 1929 and 1932, average farm commodity prices 
36 fell by 63 percent. A decade of overproduction, international trade 
barriers, and administrative neglect in Washington had combined to make 
the agricultural depression worse than the 1ndustrial depression in the 
United States. The inability of farmers to move crops in an orderly 
way in the market resulted in huge carryovers in most agricultural 
goods. These carryovers depressed prices throughout the entire Hoover 
15 
administration, resulting in widespread discontent in rural America. 
Discontent was voiced strongly by John T. Simpson of Oklahoma 
City, the National President of the Farmer's Union. Throughout the 
early depression years Simpson presented speeches in person and on 
radio advocating government action to aid agriculture. He was most 
avid in his quest for cooperative measures in the production and pro-
cessing of agricultural goods. During 1932, he criticized publicly 
h . . . d h f h H d · · · 3 7 t e 1nact1v1ty an apat y o t e oover a m1n1strat1on. 
This discontent was also voiced by the cotton farmers of the 
country whose product prices were among the lowest. In Oklahoma, lint 
cotton dropped from its 1930 price of 8.7 cents per pound to 5.1 cents 
in 1931. 38 The situation was critical in cotton culture. In 1930, 
Oklahoma farmers harvested 1.13 million bales of !cotton. Acreage in 
cotton totaled 14.5 million acres, and overproduction continued through 
the rest of the Hoov~r administration. Of all the farms in the state, 
51.9 percent were cotton farms by 1930, and tenant farmers operated 
39 73.7 percent of those farms. As the election of 1932 neared, the 
crisis of extremely low cotton prices weighed heavily in the farmers' 
decision at the polls. 
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CHAPTER II 
FIRST YEAR OF THE AAA 
The nation displayed its discontent with Republican fiscal policy 
and its desire for a change in administration on the 1932 election. In 
that election, Roosevelt and the Democrats one of the most sweeping po-
litical victories in American history, as the newly elected president 
carried all but six northeastern stat~s. Moreover, Democratic victor-
ies in congressional and senatorial races gave that party a plurality 
of 183 House seats and 25 Senate seats over the Republicans in the 
. . 1 Seventy-third Congress. 
In the 1932 campaign, Roosevelt had captured the support of most 
Americans hurt by the depression, including farmers. Much of the farm 
support was gained when he revealed the outlines of his plan for agri-
culture while giving a speech in Topeka, Kansas, on September. 14. In 
the address, Roosevelt criticized the Hoover administration for its 
lack of understanding of farm problems and unveiled the goals of what 
would become the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. 2 The impact 
of the Topeka speech and further evidence of the inadequacy of the Farm 
Board enhanced greatly Roosevelt's popularity in the final days of the 
campaign, and on election day rural America responded to the ambitious 
promises of the Democratic party by giving the new president an over-
whelming majority of its votes. 
Roosevelt knew the hopes of unemployed and impoverished Americans 
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were in his hands as a result of the election, and he was ready to meet 
the challenge. Before the election, Roosevelt had been conferring with 
associates who possessed expertise in various fields of economics. With 
the aid of these experts he worked out potential plans to deal with the 
crises in both agriculture and industry. After his inauguration on 
March 4, he set out to solve these problems. 
The first days of the New Deal were among the most hectic in the 
history of the nation's capital. More domestic legislation passed 
through Congress in the first three months of the Roosevelt administra-
tion than ever before or after during a three month period. The most 
immediate crisis was in American banking; Roosevelt dealt with this 
problem in the first month. Then the administration turned its em-
phasis to agriculture. The plan for agriculture, I drawn up largely by 
Roosevelt friend and adviser, Rexford G. Tugwell, encouraged farmers to 
work together and to improve agriculture for the good of all farmers 
rather than for the individual. Tugwell included in the plan two of 
the main goals of farmers' movements of the 1920s, domestic allotment 
d f . 3 an arm par1ty. 
Drawing from the work of agricultural economists, M. L. Wilson, 
J. D. Black, and W. J. Spillman, in developing a program of domestic 
allotment of basic crops such as wheat, cotton, tobacco, and hogs, Tug-
well added the idea of benefit payments. The original domestic allot-
ment plan differed from the Tugwell plan in that it called for benefit 
payments on production of the past ten years, retroactively without 
acreage reduction agreements. Tugwell's plan, rather, awarded benefit 
payments to farmers only if they agreed to adjust their production 
4 downward. The other major provision of the bill included the McNary-
21 
Haugen plan for parity prices on farm products taken from the base 
period of 1909-1914. 
During the interregnum period between the election of 1932 and the 
inauguration, Tugwell presented his general plan for agriculture to 
Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture, and his associates, Mordechai 
Ezekiel, Frederic P. Lee, and Jerome Frank, and they began working on a 
final draft of the bill to be presented before Congress. In its final 
form the bill contained, in addition to McNary-Haugenism and domestic 
allotment by marketing agreements, quotas, and expor"t subsidies, crop 
reduction power with benefit payments, price supports through government 
loans, and the power to license processors. 5 They titled their plan the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act. 
Early in May the Agricultural Adjustment Act came before Congress. 
Meeting little opposition, the bill passed through the House of Repre-
sentatives with few revisions. However, by the time the bill passed 
through the Senate by a vote of 64 to 20 on May 12, it had three parts. 
Title I was the Agricultural Adjustment Act containing the above provi-
sions. Title II was the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act, creating the Farm 
Credit Administration, which provided short-term, low interest loans to 
farmers. Finally, the Senate added the Thomas Amendment to the bill. 
Authored by Senator Elmer Thomas of Oklahoma, the amendment was de-
signed to create inflation in the country. The Secretary of the 
Treasury could issue up to three billion dollars in government bonds, 
thus increasing the amount of money in circulation. The secretary 
could also issue up to three billion dollars in greenbacks. To further 
expand the money supply, the amendment authorized collection in silver 
of foreign debt payments up to fifty cents on the dollar; the same 
amount collected could be issued in silver certificates. Finally, it 
allowed the President to devalue gold up to fifty percent. 6 
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In its entirety the agricultural bill was a grant scheme for re-
covery in rural America. Based on the idea that an emergency situation 
existed, the AAA granted extraordinary powers to both the President and 
the Secretary of Agriculture. The provisions of the Thomas Amendment 
gave the President unprecedented power over the money supply of the na-
tion and also the power to refinance farm mortgages through the Farm 
Credit Administration. Henry A. Wallace held more power than his father, 
Henry C. Wallace, ever considered possible during his time as Secretary. 
The AAA made available to the new secretary the best points of the 
strongest farm measures discussed during the 1920s. With the power to 
raise prices by curtailing production and to tax processors in order to 
raise revenue for rental payments, Wallace was, indeed, the Czar of 
Agriculture. 7 
Raised in a family of agrarian intellectuals from Iowa, Wallace 
followed in his father's footsteps, moving from editor of Wallace's 
Farmer magazine to Washington, D.C. to become Secretary of Agriculture. 
When in Washington, Wallace made an able spokesman. He was a vigorous 
supporter of most of the progressive farm bills of the 1920s, and ad-
vocated that the government not limit itself to one program but adopt 
several, and allow the secretary to choose the administration of them. 
Justifying government intervention in the private sector, Wallace cited 
the unique position of agriculture in an industrial society. He said 
agriculture had had two major setbacks since World War I, the disap-
pearance of foreign markets and the depression. During the 1920s, 
Wallace said industrial prices remained constant at the expense of 
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agricultural prices and while prices set the supply of industrial goods, 
supply set the prices of agricultural goods. Thus, there existed a 
delicate balance between agriculture and industry which was destroyed 
by the depression, creating the need for government intervention. 9 
Upon passage of the farm bill, Wallace began choosing his staff. 
As chief administrator of the AAA, he selected George N. Peek, the 
pioneer in the battle for farm parity. Peek's co-administrator was 
Charles J. Brand, another advocate of the McNary-Haugen plan. To head 
the productions divisions of the AAA, Wallace appointed Chester Davis, 
and chose M. L. Wilson to head the wheat division, and Cully Cobb, a 
Georgia cotton farmer and co-editor of the Georgia-Alabama division of 
The Progressive Farmer, to head the cotton division. In addition to 
the administrators and division chiefs, the AAA provided for a general 
counsel or legal division. Wallace chose Jerome Frank as chief of the 
general counsel, and Frank appointed a staff of lawyers, who included 
Abe Fortas, Adlai Stevenson, Alger Hiss, and Gardner Jackson. 10 
Problems developed shortly after the appointment of the AAA 
leaders. Peek, a traditional agrarian, supported the AAA plan for 
parity, but did not support the idea of crop reduction, calling it a 
destructive measure. Rather than that program, he favored a plan in 
which the government would buy up farm surpluses and sell them at low 
prices on foreign markets. Peek also loathed the idea of taxing food 
processors, feeling it was an illegal interference in private business. 
Thus, he was opposed to the parts of the plan which Tugwell, Wallace, 
and Frank felt were most important. Peek distrusted the appointees of 
Jerome Frank intensely. He said of them, 
••• a plague of young lawyers settled ort Washington. They 
all claimed to be friends of somebody or other and mostly 
Felix Frankfurter and Jerome Frank. They floated airily 
into offices, took desks, asked for papers, and found no end 
of things to be busy about. I never found out why they came, 
what they did, or why they left.ll 
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The many liberals working in the AAA, conversely, distrusted Peek 
and the traditionalists. They believed profit motives were dying in 
agriculture, and the government must take a greater role in creating a 
planned economy. These liberals, such as Tugwell, Frank, Stevenson, 
and Hiss, saw the traditionalists as representatives of vested interests 
in agriculture •. They opposed the Peek plan of dumping surplus agricul-
tural goods on for~ign markets, arguing it would be disastrous to 
foreign relations. The ensuing controversy between Peek and the liber-
als intensified as the summer of 1933 passed, with both sides standing 
f . 12 1rm. 
In November, amid the controversy over dumping American wheat sur-
pluses in China, George N. Peek resigned. His insistence on disposing 
of surpluses in this manner, and his reluctance to carry out the re-
duction programs prompted Roosevelt to reassign him to another position 
in foreign trade. As his successor, Henry Wallace chose Chester Davis, 
a friend of Peek's in the McNary-Ha~gen battles of the 1920s, but a man 
more favorable to the New Deal measures. Davis became the real force 
h d f h AAA h h h f . . 13 in t e a ministration o t e t roug t e rest o 1ts ex1stence. 
Even under Peek's direction, the AAA had a tremendous impact upon 
agriculture. Each crop division had extensive and specific plans for 
recovery; each crop division employed hundreds of workers to carry out 
those plans. To relieve the chronic overproduction situation in the 
Cotton Belt, the AAA developed a cash-and-option plan where farmers 
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were allowed to be paid not only in cash reduction payments, but also 
in option cotton. This was cotton carried over from the most recent 
harvests and purchased by the Farm Credit Administration at a very low 
price. Farmers could purchase option cotton at six cents per pound up 
to the amount which they agreed to reduce their 1933 crop. By the time 
the AAA programs went into effect, however, cotton farmers had already 
planted their fields, and the prospects were excellent for a bumper 
14 
crop. 
To avoid a tremendous addition to the already huge surplus in cot-
ton, AAA leaders placed the major emphasis of its plan upon reducing 
acreage. With the prospects of four cent cotton further depressing 
farmers, the Cotton Section believed it was necessary to destroy a siz-
1 
able portion of the 1933 crop ripening in the summer sun. Thus, the 
Cotton Section officials offered, in 1933, voluntary contracts in which 
the farmer agreed to reduce his acreage by plowing over a part of his 
cotton in return for cash rental payments and option cotton. In order 
to finance the running of the Cotton Section and the contract payments 
to farmers, the AAA levied a tax on the first domestic processing of 
cotton, and also a tax on manufacturers of cotton substitutes such as 
rayon. With the anticipated returns from these taxes, the AAA hoped to 
be able not only to finance the program and the rental payments but 
also to provide loans to cotton farmers while their benefit payments 
were being processed. To dispe~se these loans the President organized 
the Commodity Credit Corporation in the fall of 1933, and gave it 250 
15 
million dollars with which to operate. This, in essence, was the 
cotton plan for 1933. 
Dispensing the authority of the AAA on the state and local level 
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was the next step in carrying out the Roosevelt plan for agriculture. 
The ambitious plan required that able administrators be chosen in all 
agrarian sections of the nation to conduct and monitor the various pro-
grams. The Secretary of Agriculture chose the M. L. Wilson plan to 
place state control of the AAA in the hands of the state Agricultural 
Extension directors. On the local level AAA power was given to each 
agricultural extension station and the county extension agents became 
the spokesmen for the AAA, explaining the program and promoting co-
operation. These county agencies built up over the years and devoted 
to agricultural education were the logical organizations to dispense 
the policies of the AAA on the local level, as they were already exist-
ent in seventy-seven percent of the cotton growing counties of the na-
1 
tion. Also, sixty-five percent of these counties had vocational-
agricultural schools where, in 1933, extension agents and vocational-
agricultural teachers explained the complexities of the cotton program 
50 000 f d . h . 1 16 to some , armers atten 1ng t e1r c asses. 
As the AAA program was voluntary in nature, adequate explanation 
and promotion were essential for its success; promotion came from all 
parts of the AAA. "The cotton crop looks great for 1933, and there is 
already a thirteen million bale carryover:," wrote President Roosevelt 
in a Department of Agriculture circular during the late spring of 1933. 
He further appealed to cotton farmers around the country to cooperate, 
lib h 1 I d d d . 1117 ecause t e p an s success epen e upon 1t. Meanwhile, Henry 
Wallace, writing in the April, 1933, Oklahoma Farmer-Stockman, out-
lined the cotton plan and explained its goals of reduction, taxation, 
and parity. The AAA program received initial support from most farm 
periodicals around the nation, including the Farmer-Stockman and The 
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Progressive Farmer. The editors of these magazine, Clarence Roberts 
and Eugene Butler, wrote numerous articles on the value and need for 
the New Deal programs. Other articles detailed the workings of the 
various programs and urged farmers to cooperate for the good nf the 
country. They further warned that if farmers did not participate in 
the reduction program, the desperate situation in the Cotton Belt would 
18 
only become worse. 
The economic problems of the Cotton Belt were indeed critical when 
the AAA went into effect. While cotton farmers were spared some of the 
hardships of the 1920s with relatively high prices in relation to other 
farm goods, the collapse of foreign markets and the introduction of al-
ternative man-made fabrics caused cotton prices to plummet between 1929 
and 1932. During this time gross farm income in ;cotton production fell 
62 percent, and cotton prices per pound fell to 6.52 cents with a parity 
price index of 59 on the 1910-1914 base of 100. As a percentage of na-
tional income, cotton income had declined also from 1.66 in 1910 to 
0.17 in 1932. At the depth of the Great Depression the st~ndard of 
1 . h c 1 h 1 f f h . 19 iv1ng in t e otton Be t was t e owest o any part o t e nat1on. 
As cotton was a large portion of the state income before the de-
pression, the overproduction crisis had a tremendous impact on Oklahoma. 
In 1932, ninety percent of the cotton growers in the state operated at 
a loss, and the prospects were good for an even higher percentage in 
1933. As no other crops brought better returns, cotton farmers con-
tinued their operations and in 1933 planted over four million acres of 
cotton in the state. When the policies of the 1933 cotton program were 
announced and explained Oklahoma cotton farmers responded by rushing to 
the county agents in their areas to sign up for the program. In the 
1933 program the county agents served only to assess the rental value 
of the land which the farmers wished to remove from production, and, 
with approval from the agent, the contracts were sent directly to the 
AAA in Washington. 
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In that year, Oklahoma cotton farmers signed up over 1.2 million 
acres, or approximately twenty-five percent of the crop, in the plow-up 
campaign. By the end of the year the benefit payment checks were sent 
to Oklahoma from the nation's capital amounting to $11,730,000. These 
checks were the salvation of many cotton farmers and allowed them to 
farm for another year. For the thousands of cotton sharecroppers and 
share tenants in the state, the program was fortunately of great help. 20 
The AAA programs, however, brought to the forefront problems in the 
nature and position of farm tenancy which had be~n brewing for many 
years. Nineteenth century policies for disposal of the remaining pub-
lic lands were designed to promote ownership in the unclaimed areas by 
providing homestead rights and cheap land. Yet in the slaveholding 
areas of the South and Southwest, the outcome of the Civil War resulted 
in a multitude of landless farmers forced into tenancy. The cotton 
plantations continued after the war under the share crop and crop lein 
systems; and these systems continued to grow through the first one-
third of the twentieth century. The governmental attitude toward 
tenancy during the early twentieth century was developed by W. J. 
Spillman's Agricultural Ladder Theory. Formulated in the 1920s the 
Spillman theory stated the tenancy problem would correct itself over 
the years as farmers moved from the bottom rung of the ladder as a farm 
laborer to sharecropper. From sharecropping, farmers moved to tenancy, 
and finally to ownership. The theory held true in many areas of the 
nation, but with seventy-three percent of the country's cotton farms 
tenant operated by 1930, the agricultural ladder had become, in the 
words of Roosevelt, "a treadmill in the South. 1121 
With its crop reduction programs and benefit payments the AAA 
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caused great changes in the tenant structure of the nation, especially 
in the Cotton Belt during the 1930s. In 1933, however, the landlord-
tenant problems, due to the AAA, were just beginning. The eventual de-
cline of the tenants' position was delayed for a year by the provisions 
of the 1933 AAA cotton plan, which provided that the benefit payments 
for plowing over seeded cotton be divided among landlords and tenants 
according to their interest in the crop. This situation actually fa-
vored the tenant, as he could demand payment for each acre he farmed 
! 
and plowed under. The AAA stipulated that all cotton tenants, from 
sharecroppers to cash tenants, could participate fully in the reduction 
program if they agreed to reduce their 1933 acreage by not less than 
22 
twenty-five percent and not more than fifty percent. 
The tenancy situation in Oklahoma was of particular concern to the 
state AAA administrators. Operating in Stillwater, the state director, 
D. P. Trent, and his associates, Carl P. Blackwell, J. T. Sanders, Roy 
A Ballinger, and Joseph C. Scott, found the tenancy rates in certain 
areas of Oklahoma to be exceptionally high. Surveys conducted revealed 
the tenancy rates in southwestern and south central Oklahoma ran from 
sixty to seventy percent in 1930, while in areas of the central and 
northeastern part of the state, rates ran from seventy to eighty per-
cent. The survey also revealed the areas of highest tenancy rates were 
areas of the highest cotton production. Tenant farmers operated sixty-
two out of one hundred farms in 1930, while non-operating owners held 
30 
sixty-nine percent of all land and buildings~ 23 Thus, for a state 
which had more than one-half of its territory opened to free home-
stead, the tenancy figures were shockingly high by 1930. 
The percentage of tenancy in Oklahoma was 69.5 as compared to the 
national rate of 58. 24 Of that 69.5 percent, tenants who operated on 
a cash-rental basis constituted only fifteen percent of the total, 
while share tenants who provided partial means of production at varying 
levels, and sharecroppers who provided only the labor, made up over 
25 fifty-three percent. The remaining percentage consisted of non-
managing tenants and managing share tenants. The tenants who rented 
Oklahoma lands had little stability, as the average length of their 
26 leases was just slightly over one year through the 1930s. As a re-
sult of these short leases, which were most prevalent in eastern Okla-
homa, tenants had neither security nor regard for the land which they 
farmed. They farmed on a year-to-year basis on farms averaging seventy-
27 
two acres. At the mercy of land owners and the later policies of the 
AAA, the majority of Oklahoma tenant farmers were forced migrants and 
transients with little hope of ever gaining ownership. Farsighted mem-
bers of the AAA recognized the potential problems of landlord-tenant 
relations beginning in 1933, yet they knew that these problems could 
not be allowed to stand in the way of the general plan for agricultural 
recovery. 
As 1933 came to a close the impact of the AAA was evidenced in the 
Cotton Belt. The plow-up program resulted in nearly eleven million 
acres of cotton land removed from production; total acreage harvested 
f h h . "11" 28 or t e year was t 1rty m1 1on. The cotton carryover still in-
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creased by approximately ten million bales. Much of the cotton, 
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however, was held by the Commodity Credit Corporation as option cotton. 
Farmers, extension agents, and AAA employees congratulated themselves 
and each other on reducing the crop from a proposed thirteen million 
bales to 9.5 million. Prices increased to nearly nine cents per pound 
30 by the end of the year. Thus, the initial year of the AAA was con-
sidered a success by most people, including tenant farmers. Enabling 
them to act as owners in the plow-up campaign the AAA was the salva-
tion of many cotton tenants who could not have survived another year of 
five cent cotton and absence of government aid. 
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CHAPTER III 
A NEW PLAN TAKES EFFECT 
The cotton plan for 1934 and 1935 contained provisions which had 
profound impact upon the constitutional power of the AAA, and many cot-
ton farmers. After the success of the emergency legislation of 1933 
the leaders of the AAA began to develop plans for permanent reduction 
of acreage in the Cotton Belt. They were convinced that in order to 
maintain reasonable price levels in cotton lint and seed production, 
I 
ceilings must be enforced by limiting acreage permanently. This meant 
that even though the plan was voluntary, the AAA exercised its maximum 
influence by rewarding compliance and penalizing non-compliance. 
Announced late in 1933, the new cotton plan was a two-year con-
tract proposal. To participate in the plan, contracting farmers had to 
agree to reduce their acreage by not less than twenty-five and not more 
than forty-five percent for 1934; they then had to agree to reduce 
their 1935 crop by not more than thirty-five percent. In return the 
farmers received both rental and parity payments. The rental payments 
amounted to 4.5 cents per pound on the average annual yield per acre 
for the base period of 1928 through 1932. The maximum rental payment 
was, however, limited to eighteen dollars per acres. In parity pay-
ments, the farmers were to receive not less than one cent per pound on 
forty percent of their annual 1928-1932 average yield. The rental pay-
ments were to be sent in two installments--the first coming between 
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March 1 and April 30, and the second between August 1 and September 30. 
1 Parity payments were scheduled for December. 
In effect, the government was renting a sizable proportion of the 
potential cotton acreage for 1934 and 1935. The Cotton Section urged 
the farmers to plant feed crops or soil-replenishing crops on the rented 
acres. The AAA also allowed farmers to grow food crops on the rented 
acres for use by the members of the farm. The rented acres included 
only land which had been in production for at least three of the base 
years. The AAA prohibited farmers from placing eroded, washed, or gul-
lied land in the rental program, and reserved the right to inspect the 
2 
records of any contracting farmer. 
The AAA made compliance more attractive by offering to extend 
I 
loans on unsold 1933 cotton to cooperating farmers. The Commodity 
Credit Corporation was instructed to lend to farmers who signed 1934-
1935 contracts ten cents per pound for seven-eighths inch or better 
3 
middling cotton, and eight cents per pound on shorter fibered cotton. 
The loans carried an interest rate of four percent per annum, and the 
cotton on which the loan was made was stored in compresses throughout 
4 the South. 
By far the most controversial features of the 1934-1935 plan were 
the domestic allotment and the tenant provisions. In January of 1934, 
Senator John Bankhead of Alabama introduced the Bankhead Cotton Con-
trol Act to Congress. The bill proposed a nine million bale limit on 
cotton ginned in the United States for 1934. Further, the bill pro-
posed that the Secretary of Agriculture be empowered to license all 
cotton gins and regulate their activities. Finally, the proposal set 
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state quotas proportional to their average production for the last ten 
5 years. 
In April the Bankhead Act passed Congress and was submitted for a 
referendum vote by farmers. Forty-one thousand voting farmers ap-
proved of the measure by the needed two-thirds majority, and the act 
went into effect during the summer of 1934. Congress decided to allow 
ten million bales of tax-free cotton to be ginned for the year; any ex-
cess cotton ginned would have a fifty percent tax placed upon it. 6 
Senator Bankhead designed the act to place the cotton industry on a 
sound conunercial basis, and to prevent unfair competition and practices 
in putting cotton into channels of interstate and foreign conunerce. He 
also sought to protect contracting farmers from non-signers who would 
have had an unfai~ advantage without the penalty features of the act. 
The Bankhead Act gave the cotton program a true production control 
clause; by limiting the number of tax-free pounds ginned, the act 
f df d h . 1. 7 orce armers to re uce t eLr p antLngs. The extraordinary powers 
granted to the Secretary of Ag~iculture by this act were both contra-
versial and possibly unconstitutional, and would become a critical area 
of policy for the AAA in later days. 
The tenant provisions for the 1934~1935 cotton contract ptoved to 
be disastrous for many cotton tenants. The plan stated that the Secre-
tary would sign contracts only with land-owners, cash tenants, managing 
cash tenants, and managing share tenants. While the first three clas-
sifications of tenants were defined clearly, the managing share tenant 
required explanation. The managing share tenant was defined as a 
tenant who furnished work stock, equipment, and labor, and managed the 
operation of his farm. 8 While the cash tenants were to share fully in 
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both the rental and parity payments and managing share tenants were to 
receive one-half of the rental and all of the parity payments, the non-
managing share tenants and sharecroppers were to receive none of the 
rental payments and only their share of the parity. Furthermore, the 
parity payments were entrusted to the landlord to dispense among the 
. 9 
croppers and non-managing tenants. 
Final provisions of the plan made a token effort to protect tenant 
rights which might have been jeopardized by the previous provisions. 
These clauses prohibited owners from reducing the number of tenants on 
their holdings unless they proved to be a nuisance. The owner was also 
responsible for enrolling the tenant acreage in the reduction plan if 
the owner so desired. Though sharecroppers and non-managing share ten-
ants could not participate in the program officially, through the land-
lords they could reduce acreage and receive benefit payments. 10 Yet in 
this area the share tenant and cropper were completely at the mercy of 
the benevolence or malevolence of the landlord. 
The potential for tenant displacement due to the cotton program 
caused the schism between agrarians an_d liberals in the AAA to become 
much wider. When the plan was announced Alger Hiss, one of the young 
lawyers of the Legal Division protested it did not protect tenants' 
rights adequately. This was also the opinion of Jerome Frank and most 
of the Legal Division. Lashing out against the liberals was Cully 
Cobb, Chief of the Cotton Section, .and the main spokesman for the 
agrarians. Cobb said the AAA was doing all it could for tenant farmers 
and furthermore there was a strong communist movement among tenants 
throughout the Cotton Belt. Cobb would not allow the displacement of 
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a small number of tenant farmers to stand in the way of the success of 
11 
the plan. 
Early in 1934, amid the tenant controversy, Chester Davis called 
D. P. Trent to Washington from his post as State Director of Agricul-
tural Extension in Oklahoma. Trent, as extension director, had done 
extensive research on tenancy in Oklahoma and was made Assistant Di-
rector of the Commodities Division. In this position Trent was Cobb's 
immediate supervisor. Trent had great sympathy for sharecroppers and 
was determined to protect their rights. This brought him onto an im-
mediate collision course with Cobb and the agrarians. Yet Trent was 
not a liberal, and he did not get along with them either. He was a 
man caught in the middle of a great conflict of which tenant problems 
wee only a small part. Trend spent only one frustrating year in Wash-
ington, coming back to Oklahoma in 1935. During his time in Washington 
Trent proposed the creation of a Landlord-Tenant Committee to ensure 
tenant rights. The proposed committee included all tenants in the cot-
ton contracts and provided a minimum wage for farm laborers. It also 
provided for the foundation of farming colonies for displaced farmers 
12 
and financial aid for tenants wanting to buy land. However, the 
proposal was rejected by Cobb and the agrarians. 
The underlying problem which exacerbated the conflict between 
agrarians and liberals was the ambiguity of paragraph 7 of the 1934-
1935 cotton plan which required signers to: 
Endeavor in good faith to bring about the reduction of 
acreage contemplated in this contract in such nianner as to 
cause the least possible amount of labor, economic and so-
cial disturbance, and to this end, insofar as possible, he 
shall effect .the acreage reduction as nearly ratably as 
practicable among tenants on this farm; shall, insofar as 
possible, maintain on this farm the normal number of tenants 
and other employees; shall permit all tenants to continue in 
the occupancy of their houses on this farm, rent free, for 
the years 1934 and 1935, respectively (unless any such tenant 
shall so conduct himself as to become a nuisance or a menace 
to the welfare of the producer); during such years shall af-
ford such tenants or employees, without cost, access for fuel 
to such wood lands belonging to this farm as he may desig-
nate; shall permit such tenants the use of an adequate por-
tion of the rented acres to grow food and feed crops for home 
consumption and for pasturage for domestically used live-
stock; and for such use of the rented acres shall permit the 
reasonable use of work animals and equipment in exchange for 
labor.l3 
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The obvious weakness of the provision was that the owner was only 
to "endeavor" to aid the tenants, and he was under no real obligation 
14 
to keep the same number of tenants. The members of the Legal Divis-
ion realized this, and sought to strengthen the policy by adopting a 
strict interpretation. They maintained the landlords were required to 
keep the same number of tenants from year to year 1 or they would be in 
violation of the law. The Cotton Section had already said landlords 
were not under any legal obligation to maintain the same number of ten-
ants, and Cobb and the agrarians were adamant in their opposition to 
h . . f F k d h L 1 D' · ' 15 t e re1nterpretat1on o Jerome ran an t e ega 1V1s1on. 
The internal strife in the AAA over the interpretation of paragraph 
7 raged on through the first month of 1934. Frank and the liberals sent 
petitions to Henry Wallace urging him to accept their interpretation or 
strengthen the terminology of the paragraph. Yet Wallace was also 
pressured from the agrarians, who appealed to his interest in the sue-
cess of the plan. The agrarians, most of whom had worked their way up 
through the Farm Bureau, the land-grant colleges, or the agricultural 
extension service, saw the liberals as naive and idealistic, with no 
real understanding of agriculture. They sympathized with the landlords 
and large farmers for they knew the success of the AAA program depended 
upon their cooperation and good faith; not with the small farmers and 
16 
sharecroppers. 
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Henry Wallace was caught in the middle between two extreme groups. 
While he understood the problems the tenant provisions created for 
sharecroppers and share tenants, he felt it was his duty to place the 
national interest above well-organized minority groups. Thus, he felt 
17 little legal sympathy for tenant problems. Ultimately, Wallace ruled 
in favor of the agrarians, when on February 5 he dismissed Jerome Frank, 
F . Sh L P d G d J k f h L 1 D. · · lS ranc1s ea, ee ressman, an ar ner ac son o t e ega lVlSlOn. 
The dismissals were actually the work of Chester Davis who wanted des-
perately to rid the AAA of all dissenters. Those who Wallace and Davis 
dismissed were the authors of the reinterpretation of the paragraph, 
and they were removed for threatening the progress of the entire cotton 
program. Davis was also afraid they were involved secretly with the 
S h T F I ij • 19 out ern enant armers n1on. 
Conservatives had branded the STFU a socialist organization from 
its beginnings in northeastern Arkansas during 1933. It was organized 
to place tenant farmers on a stronger basis with landlords, and to gain 
a better standard of living for cotton tenants throughout the Cotton 
Belt. However, socialists such as Norman Thomas and Charles McCoy were 
instrumental in founding the organization, giving it socialistic over-
tones. The main quest of the organization, after the 1934-1935 cotton 
program was announced, was to put pressure on the AAA to protect ten-
ants from unscrupulous landlords. The reinterpretation of paragraph 7 
drawn up by the liberals in the Legal Division was in response to the 
demands of the STFU. While the STFU gained support in all areas where 
cotton tenants were being displaced, including Texas and Oklahoma, the 
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purge of the liberals from the AAA in February displayed the limited 
influence of the STFU in Washington, and the utter contempt which the 
agrarians had for such an organization. The events of early 1934 gave 
clear indication of how the AAA would respond in judgments of landlord-
tenant disputes. In the opinion of Chester Davis, there was little the 
AAA could do to prevent landlords from removing tenants from their 
land. The problem in the Cotton Belt was an overabundance of workers 
d h . . bl 1 ld b d. 1 20 an t e 1nev1ta e resu t wou e 1sp acement. 
The primary reason for D. P. Trent's call to Washington was, under 
his auspices, the Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station had conducted 
extensive studies on the nature of farm tenancy in the state. Tenancy 
in Oklahoma had generally been on the increase since 1890. By the mid-
1930s, farm tenancy had increased to the point where Oklahoma ranked 
I 
sixth in the nation. As early as 1910 the tenant rate was high, with 
thirty-four of the state's seventy-seven counties having percentages 
over sixty. Over the next decade the tenant rate dropped slightly in 
most counties as the 1920 census revealed only eighteen Oklahoma coun-
ties had percentages over sixty. This decline was due to many tenant 
farmers purchasing farms by virtue of the relatively high agricultural 
prices of the decade, or the accessability of Indian allotments from 
which restrictions were removed and which could now be sold. During 
the 1920s the tenancy rate increased once again as thousands of tenants 
poured into the state from the southeast and upper midwest, and by 
1930 there were forty Oklahoma counties with rates of tenancy in excess 
. 21 
of s1xty percent. 
In that same year there were 125,329 farm tenants in Oklahoma, and 
22 
of those, 21,055 or 16.7 percent, were croppers. The majority of 
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those croppers were concentrated in the cotton areas of the Five Civil-
ized Tribes where tenant rates ran as high as eighty percent in some 
counties. In these areas the crop share rental agreement was the most 
common form of landlord-tenant arrangement during the 1920s and 1930s, 
and the contracts were mostly verbal. The usual landlord-share tenant 
agreement in cotton saw the landlord supplying the land, buildings, and 
one-fourth of the fertilizer. In return the share tenant gave the land-
lord one-fourth of his crop. In cropping, the sharecropper and his 
family provided only the labor, one-half of the fertilizer, and one-
half of the ginning costs while the owner provided everything else. The 
cropper shared his crop equally with the landlord. 23 
Such landlord-tenant agreements afforded the Oklahoma cotton crop-
pers and tenants little security. The legal bind~ng of a verbal agree-
ment was at best uncertain for the tenant, with interpretation left up 
to the discretion of the landlord. From local respect to legal claim, 
the landlord had the advantage over the tenant in a dispute whether it 
concerned tenure or crop share. 
The inadequate and outdated Oklahoma state statutes concerning 
tenancy neither clarified tenant rights nor encouraged tenant stability. 
Most Oklahoma statutes were vague, complex, and inapplicable regarding 
tenancy. T6e statutes did not distinguish between tenancy and share-
cropping agreements, and with verbal agreements it was impossible to 
distinguish between a"lease and a share crop agreement. The state 
statutes actually encouraged one-year oral agreements by requiring land-
lords to obtain any lease over one year in writing. While the statute 
was intended to strengthen tenant leases by written documentation, it 
1 d 1 dl d h b 1 1 . 1 24 on y prompte · an or s to use t e ver a agreement exc us1ve y. In 
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eastern Oklahoma, the one-year verbal agreements assured the landlord 
of maintaining his control over tenants and croppers. Such agreements 
also helped to perpetuate the share crop and crop lein systems where 
slavery once existed, and forced tenant farm families to be highly mo-
bile throughout the 1930s. 
The tenuous position of sharecropping and share tenant families in 
Oklahoma was further aggravated by their great potential to be finan-
cially victimized. A survey taken in Jackson, Garvin, and Pittsburg 
counties in which 449 cotton farmers were interviewed showed eighty~six 
percent of these farmers used seasonal credit to survive the lean years 
of the early 1930s. Most of the credit extended to tenants was merchant 
' 
credit with annual rates of interest running on the average 38.5 per-
i 
cent. With these excessive rates, the tenant could not hope to recover 
25 from debt. The tenant farmers' susceptibility to dishonest practices 
was a direct result of his limited education. A 1933 survey of share-
croppers in Oklahoma revealed 43.7 percent of the farmers had five years 
or less of formal education, while 44.7 percent had only six to eight 
years of schooling. Only 11.6 percent of the farmers surveyed had more 
h . f bl' h 1' 26 t an n1ne years o pu 1c sc oo 1ng. Most sharecropping families had 
not remained in one location long enough for their children to attend 
school during the post-bellum years in the southeast, and it was the 
sons and grandsons of these earlier sharecroppers who manned the tenant 
farms of the Cotton Belt during the 1930s. Poverty stricken, poorly 
educated, and with no sense of stability, cotton croppers and tenants 
moved yearly from farm to farm under conditions determined by the land-
lord. When the 1934-1935 cotton program went into effect, however, 
landlords throughout the Cotton Belt realized croppers and share tenants 
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were no longer profitable, if benefit payments had to be shared with 
them. 
The tenant controversies did not, however, stop the 1934 cotton 
plan from taking effect. Once again state directors of agricultural 
extension became the state AAA directors with county extension agents 
acting as representatives of the Secretary of Agriculture. 27 The state 
directors instructed the county agents to create a production control 
association to apply the cotton program on the local level. All signers 
of the 1934-1935 cotton contract became association members. These mem-
hers were to elect three officers from their group, and along with the 
extension agent divide the county up into four sections. Each section 
was to contain approximately three hundred producers who the elected 
I 28 
officials and the extension agent monitored for compliance. The Sec-
retary of Agriculture authorized these officials to assess the land 
farmers wishes to place in rental acres for its past average yield per 
acre and submit the contracts to the state director. To review these 
contracts the state director appointed a three-man board. The board 
computed the allotment and issued tax exemptions after the Bankhead 
Cotton Control Act passed Congress. After reviewing and evaluating 
the applications the board notified the cotton farmer of the amount of 
his payment and sent the certificate to the local cotton production 
control associations for distribution. 29 
In Oklahoma the 1934 reduction campaign was a great success. With 
D. P. Trent assigned to Washington for the year, his associate of 
30 
Oklahoma A & M College, E. E. Scholl became acting state director. 
Trent was scheduled to return at the end of the year when his work on 
31 
tenant problems was completed. Promotional campaigns and instruction 
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prompted cotton farmers from all areas of the state to enroll land in 
the reduction program. Eager farmers who met the eligibility require-
ments of the 1934-1935 program called upon their county extension agents 
and the monitors of the cotton production control associations to as-
sess their rental acres and to send them to the state director for 
evaluation. By April, Oklahoma cotton farmers had signed contracts 
totaling 88,594 acres which had been assessed on the average at 160 
32 pounds per acre. Meanwhile, cotton farmers from around the nation 
signed contracts placing 15.1 million acres in the acreage reduction 
33 program. 
The reduction campaign was so successful in Oklahoma that E. E. 
Scholl reported to Cully Cobb in early May that approximately eighty-
five percent of all eligible Oklahoma cotton far~ers had signed con-
I 
tracts representing approximately eighty-five percent of the total cot-
34 
ton acreage. With this amount of cotton acreage taken out of 
production, prices for Oklahoma cotton rose dramatically. Average 
prices for June, 1934, increased by 3.7 cents over those of the pre-
vious June to 11.3 cents for cotton lint, while seed prices more than 
doubled, rising from 10.88 cents in June, 1933, to 24.21 cents in June, 
1934. 35 For the first time since the early 1920s cotton lint and seed 
prices brought parity price levels to cotton farmers as the average 
36 price index for 1934 was 102. Thus the AAA made great strides in re-
covery for most cotton farmers during 1934, yet these strides were made 
at the expense of the cotton share tenant and sharecropper. 
Clarence Roberts of The Oklahoma Farmer-Stockman who had been an 
avid supporter of the New Deal programs for agriculture in 1933 changed 
his opinion drastically when the 1934-1935 plans were revealed. He 
47 
became suspicious of the administration's intentions to remove large 
tracts of farm land from production permanently. He feared the ultimate 
goal of Franklin Roosevelt and his advisers was to retire all poor lands 
from production until the remaining land met only the nation's needs. 
Roberts accused the New Dealers of intending to eliminate the marginal 
farmer because he was poor and because he contributed to the surplus in 
cash crops. He further stated the real culprit in overproduction was 
mechanization, and by his campaign to wipe out the marginal farmer, 
Roosevelt was destroying the family farm, free enterprise, and self-
'd 37 pr1 e. 
From late 1933 until the end of the AAA, Roberts was an open critic 
of the Roosevelt agricultural plans. His most poignant criticism 
stressed the AAA's injustice to tenant farmers. He contended that all 
types of tenant farmers should be allowed to participate in the pro-
grams, and the idea of croppers receiving only one-half of the parity 
38 payments was absurd. He used his magazine as a pulpit to preach 
against the violations of tenants' rights and the AAA's lack of forti-
tude in protecting those rights. He urged renters who believed they 
were being treated unfairly by their landlords to report such actions 
. 39 
to the state AAA or to him d1rectly. Roberts also corresponded fre-
quently with Chester Davis belaboring him abo~t the displacement of 
sharecroppers and tenants in Texas and Oklahoma. A perfect example of 
such displacements occurred in Palmer, Texas, and Roberts sent Davis a 
letter in regard to the case. He submitted a copy of the letter sent 
by a Palmer, Texas, sharecropper who complied fully with the 1933 cot-
ton reduction program, only to be ordered off the farm in 1934 as the 
owner had decided to farm the land with hired labor. Roberts told 
48 
Davis this was a common occurrence in Oklahoma and Texas cotton fields 
due to the AAA's policies. The owner felt he could make more money 
operating the farm with hired labor than using renters or sharecroppers 
40 
with whom he must divide the parity and rental payments. 
Yet Clarence Roberts was not alone in his harsh criticism of the 
AAA's tenant provisions. During 1934 tenant complaints poured in from 
. 41 
all over the country. D. P. Trent investigated over 1400 complaints 
during 1934. In over one thousand of those cases he ruled the com-
plaints to be unjustified and no legal action was taken. During the 
42 year only twenty-one AAA contracts were revoked. With the attitudes 
of the men in power in the AAA toward tenancy, Trent could do little 
else. Reports by the AAA showed 40.6 tenant families made a move of 
some kind in 1934. 43 
Further opposition to the AAA programs centered around the Bank-
head Act and the processing tax. Opposing the Bankhead Act was the 
Oklahoma Anti-Bankhead Tax League organized by Louis Fey. The tax 
league believed the Bankhead Act was unfair because most the cotton 
crop was already in the ground by the time the bill passed. Further-
more, they argued there was no real emergency in cotton production and 
that to retard production was self-defeating. 44 This opposition eased 
somewhat when Oklahoma failed to meet its allowable marketing quota by 
thirty-five percent. August estimates showed Oklahoma would gin oniy 
509,000 bales in 1934, falling far short of its allotment of 782,631 
bales. The reason for this was the severe drcught which hit the south-
45 
western cotton growing areas of the state. 
As 1934 came to a close people criticized the AAA for a variety 
of reasons. Some were appalled by the displacement of farm tenants 
49 
caused indirectly by the AAA, while others were opposed to the AAA's 
growing control over agriculture. Many believed the AAA was destroying 
free enterprise in agriculture. Yet the successes during the first full 
year of the AAA could not be denied. The act had proven to be bene-
ficial to most farmers, and there were still many supporters. 46 The 
price index for all Oklahoma farm goods rose from forty-five in 1933 
to eighty-five in 1934. 47 The Agricultural Adjustment Act was working, 
but it was in danger. 
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CHAPTER IV 
LAST YEAR OF THE AAA 
Although pressured and criticized, AAA officials continued their 
recovery work through 1935 undaunted. The leaders of the Cotton Sec-
tion embarked upon the second phase of their two-year plan with few re-
visions. For 1935 the Cotton Section offered farmers who did not 
participate in the 1934-1935 program, a one-year contract with a 4.5 
cent per pound rental payment if those farmers reduced their acreage 
by not less than twenty-five percent from the base period average of 
1928-1932. 1 Parity payments were increased to 1.25 cents per pound. 
Most other areas of policy, such as the processing tax, the Bankhead 
Act, and the tenant provisions remained in effect. 
There were, however, some significant changes in the administra-
tion of the AAA in 1935. After the purge of the liberals in the Legal 
Division, Henry Wallace and Chester Davis set out to reorganize the 
AAA. In February, 1935, they succeeded, and the AAA was transformed 
into a simpler, more efficient organization. This streamlining in-
eluded removal of the Legal Division from its status as a division of 
AAA and merging it with the Office of the Solicitor of the Department 
. 2 
of Agr1culture. In addition, the thirteen various commodity sections 
of the organization were reduced to six divisions, and the directors 
of these divisions, along with the directors of the Finance, Planning, 
and Information Divisions, the Chief of the Extension Service, the 
53 
Chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, and the Secretary and 
Undersecretary of Agriculture, made up the new operating council. 3 
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Wallace and Davis hoped this new alignment would be more efficient and 
eliminate much of the internal friction of the past years. 
Though the 1935 realignment helped to make the AAA more efficient, 
it did not reduce the criticism of its programs. In cotton, opposition 
to the penalty clauses of the Bankhead Act, growing in 1934, intensified 
during 1935. The Bankhead Act licensed all cotton gins in the nation 
and authorized the ginners to levy a fifty p~rcent tax on all cotton; 
the amount of tax being determined by a spot check of ten American cot-
ton market prices. 4 For 1935 the tax was five cents per pound. County 
agents along with the elected officials of the cotton committees issued 
tax exemption certificates to cooperating producefs up to the allotment 
and marketing quota which had been set for them. If a producer failed 
to meet his allotment he could give or sell his unused tax exemption 
certificates to a producer who needed them. The Cotton Division set 
the national allotment for 1935 at 10.5 million bales. 5 
Complaints about the Bankhead ranged from its alleged unfairness 
to tenants and croppers to its role in the United States losing its 
dominance as the world's leading cotton producer. To the chagrin of 
advocates of the bill, many small farmers entitled to tax exemptions 
paid the tax at the gin and had gone bankrupt before their exemption 
money arrived. Critics maintained the Bankhead bill could not act 
quickly enough to give real aid to small farmers, and thus the result 
for these farmers was negative. 6 
The Bankhead Act was also supposed to be beneficial to tenants and 
sharecroppers. Yet by late 1934 tenant complaints were pouring into 
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Washington concerning the injustice of the plan. Most of the complaints 
centered around landlords forcing tenants to sign trust agreements to 
handle the tenants' share of the tax and then keeping the certificates 
for themselves. Another problem was that many tenants and sharecroppers 
who were no.t eligible to participate in the acreage production program 
did not think they had to apply for the tax certificates, and failed to 
7 do so. Thus very few tenants and sharecroppers even took advantage of 
the tax exemption, and therefore, they had to pay the high tax on all 
cotton they ginned. 
The idea of controlled production brought complaints from many 
large producers for another reason. They argued that ceilings on Ameri-
can cotton production only allowed foreign producers to make up for the 
I 
reduced yield. For many years the .United States had produced roughly 
one-half of the world's cotton. With controlled production many large 
farmers were convinced that increased production in South America, 
China, and India would more than compensate for the United States' re-
ductions and maintain the world carryover in cotton. Thus, the act re-
stricted large American producers from selling surpluses on the foreign 
markets everi at the low world price. 8 
The criticism and controversy surrounding the Bankhead Act prompted 
AAA leaders to try to determine whether or not farmers desired to con-
tinue under its provisions. On December 14, 1934, they conducted a 
referendum giving all eligible cotton farmers the opportunity to vote. 
Of the estimated number of eligible voters, fifty-seven percent partici-
pated, and of those ninety percent, or 1,361,536, surprisingly voted in 
9 favor of continuing the Bankhead proposals. In spite of all the 
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criticism, the overwhelming majority of cotton farmers in the nation 
favored continuing the production controls of the Bankhead Act. 
Far more damaging to the AAA was the growing opposition to the 
processing tax. Controversial from the start, the processing tax was 
integral part of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. By levying a tax on 
the first domestic processor of the commodity the AAA derived funds to 
finance the workings of the organization. In cotton, AAA leaders 
levied the tax on textile mills, and it was these processors who 
launched the main assult on the AAA's revenue plan. They argued that 
the tax made foreign cotton goods cheaper by forcing the millers to 
charge higher prices for their finished products. This they argued 
would eventually drive American sales down and bring further economic 
10 I 
woes to the Cotton Belt. Another major complaint questioned the con-
stitutionality of such a tax. Many believed the power of taxation which 
Congress had granted the Secretary of Agriculture was in violation of 
the constitution, and now that an emergency no longer existed in cotton 
farming, that privilege should be removed. Finally, they maintained 
that federal crop control within a state was a violation of states' 
. h d . 1 d d . . . 1 . '1 11 r1g ts an not 1nc u e 1n const1tut1ona pr1v1 ege. 
Henry Wallace offered a vigorous defense against these arguments. 
He contended the processing tax could not make foreign cotton materials 
cheaper when sold in the United States because the tenets of th~ tax 
provided that the import duties placed upon foreign cotton were re-
quired to equal the amount of the processing tax. Thus the cost of 
transportation and the high import duties necessarily made foreign 
cotton goods, even using cotton produced at a lower price than domestic 
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cotton, more expensive. He further argued that on any American cotton 
products sold abroad, the processing tax was refunded. 12 
Wallace's arguments favoring the processing tax did little to stop 
the protests of the processors who loathed the idea of paying a tax on 
raw produce in order to finance a program to raise domestic prices. 
During 1935 processors, not only in cotton but in all areas where the 
tax was being levied, revolted against the tax. By August there were 
over four hundred lawsuits in state and federal district courts chal-
lenging the AAA's authority to levy such a tax, and in several of these 
cases judges ruled in favor of the processors, thus negating the power 
of the AAA. In response to these challenges to AAA authority, President 
Roosevelt spoke out in defense of the program. He said that agricul-
i 
ture, unlike industry which could set its own pripes, needed price pro-
tection. The pending lawsuits and those which have ruled in favor of 
processors, he stated, had no effect on the AAA, and it would continue 
to function in spite of these rulings. He finally reassured farmers 
who had signed reduction contracts by promising them that the AAA would 
pay the 1.1 billion dollars in outstanding contracts even if the pro-
13 
cessing tax was outlawed. 
Opposition to the tax nonetheless resulted in amendments to the 
processing tax. Ironically these amendments strengthened the taxing 
provisions and placed them on a much sounder constitutional basis. The 
amendments permitted the Secretary to tax competing fiber producers, to 
buy up all excess cotton in the nation, and to make payments for ad-
justments in cotton production rather than just for reductions. In 
addition the amendments gave Congress the power to set the specific 
tax rate if the rates set by the Secretary were declared 
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unconst1tut1ona • With these amendments the processing tax, which had 
been the most assailed of the AAA programs, took a secondary position to 
criticism of tenant problems late in 1935. 
More complaints came to the AAA offices throughout the year. After 
Mary Conner Myers and other AAA officials made on-the-scene investiga-
tions of some of the more troubled spots in the Cotton Belt where the 
STFU was most influential, they reported dismal tales of the conditions 
under which many cotton tenants lived and gave numerous examples of 
persecutions by the landlords. By the spring the findings of some of 
these reports surfaced and began appearing in newspapers and magazines 
15 
across the country. These articles brought to national attention 
most of the tenant controversies which had been temporarily hushed by 
i 
the purge of the liberals in 1934. Now the AAA ~as in the national 
focus, not as the protector of the small farmer but as the destroyer of 
tenant farmers. With growing opposition to the entire program and STFU 
violence erupting in northern Arkansas during the spring of 1935, of-
ficials of the Cotton Division decided it would be wise to enact some 
16 
measures to protect tenant rights in the Cotton Belt. 
In March, the leaders of the Cotton Division recommended that a 
landlord-tenant relations unit be established with a staff in Washing-
ton to deal with problems and a unit in each cotton state to investi-
gate complaints locally. They named W. J. Green as the head of the 
Landlord-Tenant Relations Unit. They authorized him to conduct a sur-
vey of the experience of families on the relief rolls of the Federal 
Emergency Relief Administration in areas where cotton tenant complaints 
were numerous. Green selected a supervisor from each state who surveyed 
tenant farmers in three to six selected cotton counties. The supervisor 
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asked the tenants, who had to have been on farms which were covered by 
the 1933 or 1934 cotton contract, various questions ranging from whether 
or not their former landlord had allowed them to use the rented acres 
for food crops to the reasons for their evictions. After the surveys 
were completed, Green compiled them into a summary known as the Green 
17 
Report. 
In the report, Green concluded there was little connection between 
the number of people on relief rolls and the number of displaced tenants 
due to the fact that a very low percentage of the families on relief in 
these .areas were tenant families. Green was shortsighted in his con-
elusion in that he failed or refused to recognize that the most dis-
placed tenant fa~il~es did not go on the relief rolls, but moved on to 
I 
another farm in the following year. The report ~ontained statistics 
which demonstrated this theory. In Arkansas, 37.1 percent of all ten-
ants moved in 1933, while in 1934 and 1935, 45.5 and 43.4 percent moved 
from the surveyed counties. The Oklahoma survey revealed nearly 66.6 
percent of the tenant families surveyed moved from those eastern coun-
ties during 1935. 18 Nonetheless, Green chose to ignore these findings 
and to deny that the report showed any proof that the reduction program 
had substantial effect upon tenant displacement. 
The Green Report, even with Green's conclusions, still proved to 
be damaging to the Cotton Division; enough so that the head of the AAA 
Press Section recommended that Clarence Davis prevent it from being 
published. The Cotton Division experienced more trouble when investi-
gations revealed over 1200 disputed 1934-1935 cotton contracts had been 
paid without investigations of the disputed claims. The inquiry or-
dered by the Chief Administrator lasted eight months, and many AAA 
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workers were questioned. Most of them admitted they had been instructed 
by their supervisors to shelve any unfavorable correspondence which 
19 
would retard the progress of the program. Thus, many of the potential 
tenant disputes never reached the AAA officials who were employed to 
deal with them. 
The tenant turmoil of late 1935 resulted in an expansion of the 
powers of the Landlord-Tenant Relations Unit beginning at the end of 
the year, yet the future plans of the LTRU, along with the Cotton Di-
vision and the entire AAA were abruptly halted by the United States 
Supreme Court decision of January 6, 1936. The case involved the Hoosac 
Cotton Mills, a bankrupt company which the government was suing for 
f . 20 non-payment o process1ng taxes. The Supreme Court in the United 
States v. William Butler et al., Receivers of Ho~sac Mills Corporation 
declared the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935 to be invalid and un-
constitutional. Chief Justice Roberts declared that production control 
~as reserved to states rights and the processing taxes were not a le-
. . . f h f d 1 . . 21 g1t1mate exerc1se o t e e era. tax1ng power. 
Thus, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration came to an end. 
The bold scheme for agriculture proved to be too progressive for the 
time; and members of the Supreme Court, believing the emergency situa-
tion in agriculture no longer existed and the special taxing power of 
the Secretary was not longer needed, chose to restrict that power with 
-
the Hoosac Mills decision. The Supreme Court, however, did not end the 
AAA policies as in the following months most of the reduction and bene-
fit programs were continued in the Soil Conservation and Domestic Al-
22 lotment Acts. Yet the decision ended the vitality and energy which 
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the agricultural reformers brought from across the country to Washing-
ton. 
Despite the volume of criticism of its policies, the AAA had great 
success in meeting the primary goal of raising agricultural prices. 
Cotton prices rose from slightly over five cents per pound in 1932 to 
over twelve cents per pound in 1935. Cooperating farmers reduced cot-
ton acreage by 10.5 million acres in 1933, by 14.6 million acres in 
1934, and by 14 million acres in 1935. The 1935 carryover in cotton 
was diminished by the reduction program to nine million bales. The AAA 
provided another shot in the arm to American cotton farmers by awarding 
23 benefit payments totaling 353.4 million dollars for the three years. 
By 1935, cotton farmers had gained parity prices and then some for 
I 
their produce as the national average price index for cotton rose to 
r 
115.24 
Most Oklahoma cotton farmers shared in the success of the cotton 
program. By the end of 1935 Oklahoma farmers had sold Bankhead tax 
exemptions for 107 million pounds of cotton worth 4.25 million dollars. 
The cotton benefit payments for the three years totaled 8.21 million 
dollars, and from 1933 to 1935, Oklahoma farmers sold 24.4 million dol-
25 lars of cotton lint and seed. The role of Oklahoma cotton farmers in 
reducing the number of acres in cotton was evidenced by the substantial 
reduction from 4,148,228 acres in 1930 to 2,626,688 acres planted in 
cotton in 1935. 26 With higher prices, benefit payments, and tax ex-
emptions, the cotton program of the AAA was a blessing which saved the 
majority of Oklahoma cotton farmers from the poverty of the Great De-
pression. 
The cotton program proved, however, to be disastrous to the 
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farming futures of the cotton share tenant and sharecroppers in Okla-
homa, as well as the rest of the Cotton Belt. The position of the cot-
ton share tenant and sharecropper, tenuous in the best of times, was 
nonetheless weakened greatly by the policies of the AAA. 27 When the 
AAA policies made it possible for landlords to gain more profit by rent-
ing acreage to the government than by renting the land to tenants, they 
eagerly placed as much of their acreage into the program as possible. 
AAA officials attempted to aid the tenants with provisions in the con-
tracts designed to protect their rights, yet enforcement of these pro-
visions proved to be an impossible task. 
In Oklahoma, particularly the eastern half of the state where cot-
ton tenancy was highest, cropper displacements were so numerous that by 
1935 the number of cropper and share tenant farms dropped 35.2 percent, 
I 
or from 21,055 farms in 1930 to 13,640 in 1935. 28 Furthermore, while 
the number of cropper farms was declining the total number of tenant 
farms actually increased 4.25 percent during the same time. 29 At the 
same time Oklahoma farm population declined only slightly from 1,024,070 
in 1930 to 1,015,562 in 1935. 30 In 1930, croppers represented 16.7 
percent of Oklahoma tenants, and in 1935, they represented only 10.4 
31 percent. Although these statistics could be deceiving due to varia-
bles in the classification of tenancy in census taking, the facts re-
main that while farm population dropped insignficantly and the number 
of tenant farms increased, the number of cropper farms which included 
share tenant farms, primarily cotton farms, decreased substantially. 
The decline of cotton tenancy due to AAA programs is further 
evidenced by a survey of Oklahoma counties having the highest tenancy 
rates in 1930. Of the twenty counties with the highest rates, eighteen 
• 
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of them were located in eastern Oklahoma (see Appendix). These coun-
ties--Atoka, Bryan, Choctaw, Coal, Creek, Haskell, Hughes, Jefferson, 
McCurtain, Mcintosh, Marshall, Muskogee, Okfuskee, Okmulgee, Osage, 
Seminole, Sequoyah, and Wagoner--had an average tenancy rate of 73.7 
. 32 percent ~n 1930. Cotton farmers dominated the agriculture of these 
counties during this time with 950,080 acres planted in cotton in 1929, 
33 for an average of 52,782 acres. The total number of cropper farm 
operators by 1930 in these counties was 7,330, or on the average, 407 
34 per county. By 1935 both cotton acreage and the number of croppers 
in these counties declined significantly. Cropper numbers dropped by 
35 28.15 percent, totaling only 5,266 or 292 per county average. Total 
county cotton acreage declined concurrently, as farmers in these coun-
1 
ties planted only 676,964 acres in 1934, representing a 28.7 percent 
36 decrease. Cotton dominance and cotton tenancy diminished greatly in 
these areas during the days of the AAA. 
Tenant displacements continued throughout the rest of the decade 
on Oklahoma cotton lands, due to declining demand for cotton, and to 
drought conditions in the southwestern cotton counties of Oklahoma. 
Yet the displacements of share tenants and sharecroppers during the 
first years of the New Deal had little to do with the drought. The 
high instability and great mobility of these tenant families made the 
possibility of permanent residency on one farm unlikely. When Roose-
velt and his administrators installed their agricultural plan with its 
emphasis on raising prices by decreasing production, the share tenant 
and sharecropper became economically expendable. As landlords learned 
they could make more money by renting acres to the AAA, they readily 
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did so, and thus began the decline of the cotton sharecropper and share 
tenant. 
The administrators of the AAA were aware their plan might have 
disastrous effects on tenancy but they knew their program had to favor 
large farmers and landlords to succeed. AAA leaders nonetheless at-
tempted to protect tenants throughout the organization's existence, al-
though in general th~y failed to do so. In a final effort to provide 
long-term aid to displaced tenant farmers, Roosevelt created the Re-
settlement Administration in May, 1935. 37 Naming Rexford Tugwell head, 
Roosevelt and his advisers designed the RA to purchase sub-marginal 
land and subsistence homesteads to remove them from production. 38 
Roosevelt also instructed Tugwell to resettle destitute families on 
small, government controlled cooperative farms. 3 ~ 
Due to lack of popular support and the overal difficulty of the 
task, Tugwell's efforts with the RA also failed. 40 By their nature to 
AAA policies displaced tenant farmers, and little could be done about 
it. Many people maintained the displacements would have happened re-
gardless of the type of agricultural legislation, and some even said 
the AAA policies allowed tenants to remain on their farms longer than 
41 
would have been possible without them. Share tenant and sharecropper 
numbers nonetheless declined significantly throughout the Cotton Belt 
between 1930 and 1935, and AAA programs were apparently most responsi-
ble. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The years following the 1930s marked a great decline of cotton 
culture in Oklahoma, as well as most of the rest of the Cotton Belt, 
due to the disappearance of foreign demand and the appearance of al-
ternative fabrics. Oklahoma cotton production reached its peak during 
the late 1920s and eariy 1930s as did rates of cotton tenancy; yet 
tenancy was not new in the Sooner State. In the plantation areas of 
Indian Territory by the 1880s, workers employed by wealthy Indians to 
farm their lands were actually tenant farmers and sharecroppers. 
Through the early twentieth century cotton acreage and tenancy in-
creased greatly as farmers discovered the large yield potential of much 
of the state's land. During the 1920s cotton prices were high relative 
to other agricultural goods, and farmers of the western Cotton Belt 
continued to increase acreage and production. When the Great Depres-
sion struck the nation, carryovers from the 1920s resulted in declin-
ing demand and prices in cotton, and by 1932, average prices for Okla-
1 homa cotton had dropped 73.5 percent from the 1925 levels. 
This was the situation when Franklin D. Roosevelt took office in 
March of 1933. Most sectors of the American economy were either im-
periled or inoperative, but no sector was more depressed than agri-
culture. Roosevelt and his advisers created a large organization to 
promote recovery in rural America--the Agricultural Adjustment 
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Administration. The leaders of the AAA hoped to reverse the previous 
governmental hands-off policy toward agriculture and convince farmers 
they must control production to maintain favorable prices. 2 In three 
short years the AAA succeeded in bringing recovery to most areas of 
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agriculture. Designed to help all farmers in the nation, the AAA none-
theless, proved disastrous to the marginal farmers. The emergency 
situation of Roosevelt's first administration forced policymakers to 
adopt legislation which they probably realized might have inimical 
effect on the tenant farmer. 3 
The most marginal of tenant farmers in the United States were cot-
ton tenants. The share crop and crop lein systems under which most 
cotton tenants farmed were outgrowths of the destruction of slavery 
I 
following the Civil War. These debilitating systems kept cotton share 
tenants and sharecroppers indebted and poor, and gave them little chance 
of economic advancement. Poorly educated and unable to work elsewhere, 
these tenants continued to lease small plots of cotton land usually on 
a one-year oral basis, even when cotton prices fell to the lowest levels 
of the century by the early 1930s. 
The policies of the AAA altered the position of these tenants in-
directly, by altering the position of landlords. By offering landlords 
cash rental payments for acreage reduction, AAA administrators made it 
more profitable to participate in the reduction program than to lease 
lands to sharecroppers and tenants; thus the evictions began. The 
tenuous position of cotton tenants and sharecroppers made them most 
vulnerable to displacement. 
Roosevelt and his advisers realized the reduction program might 
have such an effect upon tenancy. They instructed the Legal Division, 
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headed by Jerome Frank, to employ a staff of lawyers to research tenant 
problems. When the 1934-1935 cotton contract was presented, it outraged 
members of the Legal Division for many tenants were not allowed to par-
ticipate in the program, and according to the liberals, it did not 
adequately afford protection of tenant rights. The program leaders of 
the AAA, such as Cully Cobb and Chester Davis, had little concern for 
tenants, and when the lawyers of the Legal Division wrote revisions to 
the contract, Davis and the agrarians fired them. 4 Further attempts 
were made to protect tenants from displacement, but these also failed. 
In the cotton growing areas of eastern Oklahoma where tenancy 
rates were highest, many displacements occurred from 1933 through 1935. 
How many of these displacements were directly related to AAA policies 
I 
is impossible to determine, but statistics revealed that in the coun-
ties of old Indian Territory the number of sharecroppers and share 
tenant farms declined substantially between 1930 and 1935, while state 
farm population declined only slightly. Further, cotton acreage in 
these counties declined from 1930 to 1935 at a rate near that of cropper 
and share tenant farms. Finally, AAA reports showed that in 1934 alone 
approximately 66.6 percent of tenants surveyed made some kind of move 
5 in Oklahoma. 
The Dust Bowl theory that most tenants and sharecroppers moving 
west from Oklahoma during the 1930s were victims of the drought seems 
unlikely when one considers there was little or no drought in eastern 
Oklahoma, the area of highest tenancy. Rainfall statistics revealed 
the emergency drought areas were confined to the panhandle and western 
tier of Oklahoma counties during the Dust Bowl days. Though rainfall 
may have been below normal in some years, the counties of eastern 
Oklahoma were never classified as disaster areas due to drought, and 
cotton tenants were leaving eastern Oklahoma before the dry years of 
the 1930s. 
Some historians have criticized Roosevelt and his agricultural 
plan, along with other New Deal measures, for being socialistic and 
destroying free enterprise. Conservative congressmen in Roosevelt's 
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time also lamented the New Deal policies, as one Congressman declared 
the AAA was "more Bolshevistic than anything existing in Soviet 
Russia." 6 Yet when Roosevelt became president the situation dictated 
that he make government more active in all areas of the economy. Con-
sidering the crisis state of the nation at that time, Roosevelt could 
have adopted much more collective policies than he did. Instead, he 
chose to aid the existing institutions and placelthem on the road to 
recovery. In agriculture, as in other areas, Roosevelt's policies 
were designed to aid, not all farmers as election promises stated, but 
landlords, owners, and large managers and tenants. The aid came from 
acreage reduction payments and resulting higher prices for that reduc-
tion. Yet small tenant farmers and sharecroppers, especially in cot-
ton, were adversely affected when the reduction program began. The 
plan to resettle these farmers under government supervision failed 
when the AAA was declared unconstitutional. Truly, the share tenants 
and sharecroppers were the forgotten men in agriculture. 
FOOTNOTES 
1
"Prices Received by Oklahoma Farmers, 1910-1957," p. 23. 
2 Murray Reed Benedict, Farm People and the Land After the War 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 14-15. 
3 Conrad, The Forgotten Farmers, p. 205. 
4schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal, pp. 78-80. 
5 Conrad, The Forgotten Farmers, p. 191. 
6schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal, P• 40. 
7 C. W. Mullen, "What of Landless Man?." The Oklahoma Farmer-
Stockman, XLVIII (March 15, 1935), PP• 3, 23. 
72 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Primary Sources 
Coleman, William J. and H. Alfred Hockley. "Legal Aspects of Landlord-
Tenant Relationship." Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station 
Bulletin No. 241. Stillwater: Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment 
Station, 1930. 
Current Farm Economics, VI. Stillwater: Oklahoma Agricultural Experi-
ment Station, December, 1933. 
VII. Stillwater: Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station, 
June, August, 1934. 
The Daily Oklahoman (Oklahoma City, Oklahoma), 1 
1
January 1934. 
Gray, Fenton and H. M. Calloway. Oklahoma Geological Survey: The 
Soils of Oklahoma. Stillwater: Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment 
Station, 1959. 
National Resources Commission. United States Special Committee on Farm 
Tenancy. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937. 
Oklahoma Agricultural Extension News, XV. Stillwater: Oklahoma Agri-
cultural Experiment Station, January, 1934. 
----
, XVI. Stillwater: Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station, 
October, 1935. 
"Oklahoma Farm Price Statistics, 1910-1938." Oklahoma Agricultural 
Experiment Station Bulletin No. 238. Stillwater: Oklahoma Agri-
cultural Experiment Station, 1939. 
Prices Received by Oklahoma Farmers. Processed Series, 297-311. 
Stillwater: Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station, 1948. 
Record Group 145. "Central Files of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration." National Archives. Washington, DC. 
Reports of the Secretary of Agriculture. Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1935. 
73 
74 
Sanders, J. T. "A Study of Certain Factors Leading to Social Life Among 
Oklahoma Cotton Farmers." Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Sta-
tion Bulletin No. 211. Stillwater: Oklahoma Agricultural Experi-
ment Station, 1939. 
----· "Amount and Function of Farm Tenancy in Oklahoma." Oklahoma 
Agricultural Experiment Station Biennial Reports, 1930-1932. 
Stillwater: Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station, 1932. 
"Credit Problems of Oklahoma Cotton Farmers." Oklahoma Agri-
cultural Experiment Station Bulletin No. 198. Stillwater: Oklahoma 
Agricultural Experiment Station, 1939. 
Southern, John H. "Farm Tenancy in Oklahoma." Oklahoma Agricultural 
Experiment Station Bulletin No. 239. Stillwater: Oklahoma Agri-
cultural Station, 1939. 
U.S. Bureau of the Census. Census of Agriculture, 1930, Oklahoma. 
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1931. 
Census of Agriculture 2 1935, Oklahoma. Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1936. 
Census of Agriculture 2 1940, Oklahoma. Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1941. 
Census of Agriculture, 1945, Oklahoma. Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1946. 
Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920, Agriculture. 
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1921. 
Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920, Population. 
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1921. 
Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940, Agric~lture. 
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1941. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. The Agricultural Adjustment Act Ap-
plied to Cotton. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
1933. 
Atlas of American Agriculture. Bureau of Soils Section. 
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1922. 
News Digest of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, 
II. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January, June, 
1935. 
75 
Program Planning Division. Cotton. Washington, DC: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1935. 
Yearbook of Agriculture, 1933. Washington: Government Print-
ing Office, 1933. 
Secondary Sources 
Ackerman, Joseph and Marshall Harris (eds.). Family Farm Policy. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947. 
Amberson, William. "The New Deal for Sharecroppers." Nation, CXL 
(February 13, 1935), pp. 184-187. 
Benedict, Murray Reed. Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950. 
New York: Stratford Press, Inc., 1953. 
Farm People and the Land After the War. Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1943. 
Bogue, Allen G. From Prairie to Cornbelt. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1963. 
Butler, Eugene. "Bankhead Bill Not Necessary." 
Farmer, LXIX (April, 1·934), P• 6. 
"Landlords Not to Blame." The Progressive Farmer, XLVIII 
(August, 1935), p. 3. 
"No Prosperity Without Control." The Progressive Farmer, 
XLVIII (June, 1933), P• 3. 
"What's New In Agriculture?" The Progressive Farmer, XLIX 
(July, 1934), p. 3. 
"What's New In Agriculture?" The Progressive Farmer, XLIX 
(September, 1934), p. 12. 
Butler, Tait. "A New Day in Controlled Production." The Progressive 
Farmer, XLVIII (August, 1933), p. 3. 
"Gin Control Up to Congress.". The Progressive Farmer, XLIX 
(February, 1934), p. 10. 
"New Farin Legislation." The Progressive Farmer, XLVIII 
(May, 1933), P• 7. 
"The Cotton Situation." The Progressive Farmer, XLVIII 
(November, 1933), P• 3. 
"Will We Save the Farmer Adjustment Act?" The Progressive 
Farmer, XLIX (September, 1934), p. 3. 
76 
Conrad, David A. The Forgotten Farmers: The Story of Sharecroppers in 
the New Deal. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965. 
Oebo, Angie. Rise and Fall of the Choctaw Republic. Norman: Univer-
sity of Oklahoma Press, 1934. 
Fite, Gilbert C. George N. Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity. Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1965. 
"Development of the Cotton Industry By the Five Civilized 
Tribes." Journal of Southern History, XV (1949), pp. 346-347. 
Forbes, Gerald. "Oklahoma Oil and Indian Land Tenure." Agricultural 
History, XV (1941), pp. 190-191. 
Gibson, Arrel M. Oklahoma: A History of Five Centuries. Norman, OK: 
Harlow Publishing Co., 1965. 
Graebner, Norman Arthur. "Pioneer Indian Agriculture in Oklahoma." 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, XXV (1945), pp. 240-248. 
Grubbs, Donald H. Cry From the Cotton. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1971. 
Harlow's Weekly (Oklahoma City, Oklahoma), XXXIX (December 31, 1932). 
Hofsommer, Harold. "The AAA and the Sharecropper." Social Forces, 
XIII (May, 1935), P• 497. 
Lord, Russell. The Wallaces of Iowa. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 
1947. 
Mullen, C. W. "Farmers Are Too Numerous; Not Enough Land for All." 
The Oklahoma Farmer-Stockman, XLVIII (January, 1935), p. 7. 
"What of Landless Men?" The Oklahoma Farmer-Stockman, 
XLVIII (March 15, 1935), PP• 3, 23. 
Murphy, Paul L. "The New Deal Agricultural Program and the Constitu-
tion." Agricultural History, XXIX (1950), p. 160. 
Nall, Garry L. "King Cotton in Oklahoma," in Donald A. Green (ed.), 
Rural Oklahoma. Oklahoma City: Oklahoma Historical Society, 1977. 
Nourse, Edwin G., JosephS. Davis, and John D. Black. Three Years of 
the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Washington, DC: The 
Brookings Institution, 1937. 
77 
The Oklahoma Farmer-Stockman, XLVI (Oklahoma City, Oklahoma), April 1, 
1933; XLVII, April 1, 1934; XLVIII, August 1, October 15, 1933. 
Peek, George N. Why Quit Our Own? New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 
1936. 
The Progressive Farmer, L (Oklahoma City, Oklahoma), April, June, 1935. 
Raper, Arthur F. Preface to Peasantry. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1936. 
Sharecroppers All. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1936. 
Richards, Henry I. Cotton and the AAA. Washington, DC: The Brookings 
Institution, 1936. 
Roberts, Clarence A. "Down With the Surplus." The Oklahoma Farmer-
Stockman, XLVI (July 1, 1933), p. 218. 
"Expecting Too Much." The Oklahoma Farmer-Stockman, XLVI 
(November 15, 1933), p. 380. 
"Tenant Deserves Share of the Cotton R~nt." The Oklahoma 
Farmer-Stockman, XLVIII (January 1, 1934), p. 3. 
I 
"The Cotton Loan Plan is Now Complete." The Oklahoma Farmer-
Stockman, XLVI (November 1, 1933), p. 356. 
The Crime of the Marginal Farmer." The Oklahoma Farmer-
Stockman, XLVI (December 1, 1933), p. 395. 
"Who Can Sign the Contract?" The Oklahoma-Farmer Stockman, 
XLVII (January 1, 1934), P• 3. 
Saloutos, Theodore and John D. Hicks. Agricultural Discontent in the 
Middle West, 1900-1939. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1951. 
Schlesinger, Arthur M. The Coming of the New Deal. Boston: Houghton-
Mifflin Co., 1959. 
Shannon, Fred A. The Farmers' Last Frontier: Agriculture 1860-1897. 
New York: Toronto, Farrar, and Reinhart, Inc., 1945. 
Tugwell, Rexford G. "Some Aspects of New Deal Farm Policy: The Re-
settlement Administration." Agricultural History, XXXIII (1959), 
pp. 160-161. 
The Democratic Roosevelt. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1957. 
Vance, Rupert Bayless. Farmers Without Land: New York: Public Af-
fairs Committee, 1938. 
78 
Wallace, Henry A. "Farm Bill Follows New Path." The Oklahoma Farmer-
Stockman, XLVI (April 1, 1933), pp. 115, 131. 
New Frontiers. New York: Reynald and Hitchcock, 1934. 
Webb, Walter Prescott. The Great Plains. New York: Houghton-Mifflin 
Co., 1936. 
APPENDIXES 
79 
County 
Atoka 
Bryan 
Choctaw 
Coal 
Creek 
Haskell 
Hughes 
Jefferson 
McCurtain 
Mcintosh 
Marshall 
Muskogee 
Okfuskee 
Okmulgee 
Osage 
Seminole 
Sequoyah 
Wagoner 
TOTAL 
APPENDIX A 
COTTON ACREAGE IN EASTERN OKLAHOMA, 
1929-1934 
County Cotton Acreage 
1929 Acreage 
13,518 
65' 773 
53,456 
15,023 
64,366 
39,599 
44,844 
89,489 
77' 943 
80' 236 
21,886 
96,557 
80,687 
58,094 
13' 123 
38,538 
30,626 
66,331 
950,080 
1934 Acreage 
18,635 
55,824 
33,260 
18,054 
43,087 
27,561 
33,476 
53,162 
43,847 
52,181 
20,671 
70,004 
48,022 
40,664 
15,066 
33,027 
27,816 
42,607 
676,964 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. Census of Agriculture, 1940, 
Oklahoma. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
1941. 
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County 
Atoka 
Bryan 
Choctaw 
Coal 
Creek 
Haskell 
Hughes 
Jefferson 
McCurtain 
Mcintosh 
Marshall 
Muskogee 
Okfuskee 
Okmulgee 
Osage 
Seminole 
Sequoyah 
Wagoner 
TOTAL 
APPENDIX B 
CROPPER FARMS IN EASTERN OKLAHOMA, 
1930, 1935 
Number of Cropper Farms 
1930 
153 
440 
534 
109 
674 
160 
278 
158 
796 
548 
130 
643 
564 
541 
300 
289 
444 
623 
7,330 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. Census of Agriculture, 1940, 
Oklahoma. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
1941. 
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1935 
141 
317 
418 
57 
452 
137 
143 
16 
815 
320 
91 
365 
439 
349 
190 
254 
346 
416 
5,266 
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